Innovative Research Award
Oscar Martinez Rivera,
Blanquerna (Universitat Ramon Llull),
Oscar Martinez Rivera, Spain, is presented in this academic recognition profile in connection with research concerning disability and the broader application of structured decision-making approaches to complex service and organizational problems. The profile highlights the research theme of selecting after-sales providers for complex products through game-theoretic and matching-based frameworks.
Abstract
Research on after-sales service provider selection increasingly considers the strategic and operational complexity associated with sophisticated products. The referenced research develops an integrated framework in which a Stackelberg game represents the strategic relationship between an original equipment manufacturer and an after-sales service provider, while a matching framework addresses compatibility between service requirements and provider capabilities. The study further incorporates entropy weighting and DEMATEL to identify and structure relevant evaluation attributes. [1] Related research has also demonstrated the usefulness of game theory in supplier selection for complex products, including processes involving auctions and structured bargaining. [2]
Keywords
After-sales service; service provider selection; complex products; game theory; Stackelberg game; bilateral matching; supplier selection; DEMATEL; multi-criteria decision-making; disability research; service innovation; supply-chain coordination.
Introduction
After-sales services form an important component of product life-cycle management, particularly where products involve complex technologies, specialized maintenance requirements, and long operating periods. Provider selection in such environments extends beyond a simple comparison of price and availability because organizations may need to consider technical capability, innovation capacity, qualification, service quality, financial arrangements, and compatibility with specific product requirements. The literature on supplier selection has consequently developed increasingly sophisticated analytical approaches for multi-criteria and strategically interdependent decisions. [2]
Game-theoretic methods are relevant when the decisions of one participant influence the incentives or outcomes of another participant. In complex-product environments, supplier or service-provider selection may therefore be analyzed not only as an optimization problem but also as an interaction between organizations with different objectives and constraints. Previous work has applied game theory to supplier selection and negotiation processes involving complex items. [2] Other studies have examined capacity-constrained supplier selection and cooperation using cooperative and non-cooperative game-theoretic models. [3]
Research Profile
Oscar Martinez Rivera is affiliated with Blanquerna (Universitat Ramon Llull), Spain. The supplied research profile records 12 documents, 24 citations, and an h-index of 3. The stated subject area is disability. These bibliometric indicators provide a quantitative snapshot of the supplied scholarly record; they should be interpreted in relation to publication dates, database coverage, disciplinary citation practices, and the distinction between indexed and non-indexed outputs.
The profile also identifies a Google Scholar record and an ORCID identifier, providing persistent mechanisms for associating scholarly outputs with the researcher. ORCID is designed to provide a persistent identifier for researchers and contributors, while citation databases may provide different coverage and counts depending on indexing policies.
Research Contributions
The research represented by the supplied article centers on the selection of after-sales service providers for complex products. Its analytical structure connects strategic incentives with provider–requirement matching. The study first models the interaction between an original equipment manufacturer and an after-sales service provider using a Stackelberg framework. It then develops a matching process intended to identify providers whose capabilities correspond to the requirements of complex-product after-sales activities. [1]
- Strategic interaction can be represented through a leader–follower game in which participation and innovation incentives are considered.
- Provider selection can incorporate multiple attributes rather than relying exclusively on cost-based comparisons.
- Bilateral matching can represent preferences and compatibility between service requirements and provider capabilities.
- Entropy-weighted DEMATEL can be used to assess the relative importance and causal relationships among evaluation criteria. [1]
These elements position provider selection as a multi-stage decision problem in which economic participation, technical suitability, and matching considerations can be analyzed together. Comparable game-theoretic supplier-selection research has also explored competitive selection, bargaining, and negotiation structures for complex items. [2]
Research Impact
The methodological relevance of the research lies in its integration of strategic modeling and structured provider matching. Rather than treating supplier or service-provider selection as an isolated ranking exercise, the framework described in the referenced study considers participation incentives, evaluation attributes, and bilateral compatibility. [1]
Such approaches may be relevant to complex manufacturing and service ecosystems where provider performance depends on technological capability, contractual arrangements, quality supervision, innovation capacity, and the characteristics of the product or component requiring service. Related research has shown that game-theoretic models can be used to analyze supplier cooperation, capacity constraints, and the distribution of supply-chain benefits. [3]
- Supports structured analysis of complex after-sales provider decisions.
- Connects strategic incentives with operational matching requirements.
- Provides a framework for incorporating multiple provider evaluation criteria.
- Contributes to the methodological discussion surrounding game theory and supplier selection.
Award Suitability
The Innovative Research Award is thematically relevant to research that develops or applies systematic approaches to complex academic or practical problems. In the context of the supplied research record, the combination of game-theoretic reasoning, multi-criteria assessment, and matching methodology provides a clearly identifiable methodological dimension. The referenced after-sales provider study explicitly integrates a Stackelberg game with a matching framework and entropy-weighted DEMATEL, making it relevant to an award category focused on research innovation and analytical methodology. [1]
Award assessment should nevertheless be based on the complete submission and applicable evaluation criteria, including originality, methodological rigor, documented scholarly contribution, relevance to the stated award category, and evidence supporting the researcher’s role in the work. Bibliometric indicators should be considered as contextual evidence rather than as a substitute for qualitative assessment.
Conclusion
Oscar Martinez Rivera’s supplied academic profile is associated with Blanquerna (Universitat Ramon Llull), Spain, and identifies research activity in the disability subject area alongside a scholarly record of 12 documents, 24 citations, and an h-index of 3. The research theme represented in this recognition page also intersects with contemporary work on game-theoretic supplier selection and after-sales service-provider decision-making.
The referenced research on complex-product after-sales provider selection illustrates how strategic interaction, multi-criteria evaluation, and bilateral matching can be integrated into a decision framework. [1] This methodological orientation provides the principal academic basis for considering the research in relation to an Innovative Research Award, subject to verification of the complete scholarly record and the applicable award evaluation process.
External Links
References
- Mediavilla, M., Mendibil, K., & Bernardos, C. (2021). Making the most of game theory in the supplier selection process for complex items. Production Planning & Control, 32(10), 845–860.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09537287.2020.1773560
- Between Theory and Practice: The Importance of ICT in Higher Education as a Tool for Collaborative Learning
https://scholar.google.com/citations?view_op=view_citation&hl=en&user=Uyj5Q-AAAAAJ&citation_for_view=Uyj5Q-AAAAAJ:Zph67rFs4hoC
- Transiciones vitales: una propuesta de categorización para la formación y la intervención de los profesionales de la acción socialhttps://orcid.org/0000-0003-1256-8288